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USB # 0215
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Case No. 93-0136

vs.
THE HON, MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge, Third District Court :
in and for Salt Lake County,
Defendant/Respondent.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING

PLAINTIFF RESPONDS to defendant/respondent's Petition
for Re-Hearing dated May 13, 1993 as follows:

FACTS
Respondent makes various unsworn statements of fact in
his Petition for Rehearing.

Some of the facts are mis-

leading and some are not supported by the record herein or
the actual facts of this case.

Petitioner has submitted a

Second Affidavit herein setting out the facts pertinent to
the claims made in respondent's petition for rehearing.
1

A

copy of that affidavit is attached as an Exhibit to this
Brief,
The most mis-leading statement of "fact" from the
defendant is:
In Shelley v. Shelley. Mr. Barnard's Rule 63(b)
Affidavit was filed on January 5, 1993. Before
Judge Murphy acted on the Affidavit, Commissioner
Arnett signed an Order Modifying Decree of
Divorce, resolving all of the pending issues.
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, pp. 3-4.
This statement is mis-leading because:
1. On January 5, 1993, I [plaintiff herein]
filed an Affidavit of Prejudice against Judge
Murphy in the Shelley case, a divorce action.
2. As of January 5, 1993 in the Shelley
case, (1) a petition for modification regarding
child support was still pending as well as (2) a
motion to enforce visitation and, (3) a motion to
set aside the decree.
3. On January 12, 1993 I [plaintiff herein]
submitted a request for trial setting in the
Shelley case, at that time the case appeared to be
contested and would require a trial before the
assigned judge, Judge Murphy, respondent herein.
4. There was a Pre-Trial Settlement Hearing
before Commissioner Arnett on February 10, 1993 at
which the issues were resolved. The last order
entered regarding those matter was signed on
February 22, 1993.
Second Affidavit of Plaintiff, 06/09/93, Exhibit attached.
Thus, the facts of this case are that Judge Murphy ignored
the plaintiff's Affidavit of Prejudice and did not act upon
2

it immediately after or even soon after its filing January
5, 1993 (and the related request for ruling filed on January
19, 1993).

Instead, Judge Murphy erroneously states the

Affidavit of Prejudice is now moot (Exhibit "A") and seeks
to be rewarded for his unexplained and improper delay.

ARGUMENT

SPIRIT, WORDS AND PURPOSE OF RULE 63(b)
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Respondent says, "Nothing in Rule 63(b) prohibits a
judge who is the subject of the Affidavit from stating his
reasons for finding the Affidavit is insufficient."
Petition for Rehearing, pp. 1-2.

Similarly, respondent

could say, "Nothing in Rule 63(b) prohibits a judge who is
the subject of the Affidavit from submitting his own
affidavit or affidavits of others in response to and in
contravention of the Affidavit of Prejudice."

Surely, the

spirit and purpose of Rule 63(b) (if not the clear words)
would prevent a challenged judge from entering into a fray
with a party or counsel.

Plaintiff suggests that Rule 63(b)

was intended to avoid judges getting into "swearing matches"
with parties or attorneys appearing before them.

Rule

63(b), contrary to what respondent suggests, does not embody
3

a method to embroil a judge in a battle personally defending
his or her integrity or objectivity through the use of
affidavits, findings or even guidance to the certified
judge.
The words of Rule 63(b) are clear:
Whenever a party . . . or his attorney shall make
and file an affidavit [of prejudice] . . . such
judge shall proceed no further therein, except to
call in another judge to hear and determine the
matter.
Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
"Only a lawyer" would suggest that "shall proceed no
further" somehow allows the filing of findings of fact or
conclusions of law by the challenged judge; or, as in this
case, the mis-direction of the judge to whom the matter is
certified.1

As occurred in the Montgomery case, the making

of findings, the detailing of reasons, the attempt to
provide guidance to the certified judge may well work

1

Judge Murphy by his reference to Blood and Sorensen
(and attachment of copies of orders therein) in his order
referring the Montgomery case to Judge Noel clearly mislead
Judge Noel. The prior rulings by Judge Murphy in Blood and
in Sorensen were in response to motions for recusal made in
each of those cases. The certification to Judge Noel was to
rule on an Affidavit of Prejudice filed in Montgomery which
affidavit was more detailed and relied upon different and
more particular grounds and basis that the pro forma motions
for recusal in Blood and Sorensen.
4

mischief contrary to the intent and spirit of Rule 63(b),
Ut.R.Civ.Pro.2
Contrary to the clear language of Rule 63(b), respondent now suggests that the challenged judge should make the
final decision as to whether the Affidavit of Prejudice is
timely or is moot.

Petition for Rehearing, p. 2.

There is

ho question that such determinations may be appropriate with
regard to an Affidavit of Prejudice, but the review and
resolution of such questions must be made by the certified
judge and not the challenged judge.

The certified judge has

the same ability (and the appropriate objectivity) to make
determinations as to mootness and timeliness as the
challenged judge.3

2

State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1980) cited by
respondent, is not helpful. We are not concerned in this
matter with the actions of the judge to whom the Affidavit
of Prejudice is certified for review.
3

One would think that if the objectivity and fairness
of a judge are challenged by a Rule 63(b) affidavit, that
judge would want to immediately distance himself or herself
from the tangential fray. It is unfathomable that a judge
against whom an Affidavit of Prejudice is filed would want
(much less insist upon, as Judge Murphy has done herein) to
have any participation in the determination as to the
sufficiency or propriety of the Affidavit of Prejudice.
5

"REQUESTED" MEMORANDUM OF LAW
The respondent7s claims in his petition for rehearing
(Petition for Rehearing, pp. 2-3) regarding the now infamous
and allegedly "requested" memorandum of law regarding per se
recusal are red herrings of the first school.
Respondent Murphy requested a memorandum of points and
authorities regarding per se recusal only in one case,
Blood.

That was requested only with regard to plaintiff's

motion for recusal in Blood.

Plaintiff never filed such a

memorandum and has, for all intents and purposes, abandoned
that motion for recusal.

Exhibit Affidavit attached.

Respondent Murphy never requested a memorandum of
points and authorities regarding per se recusal in Blood in
response to plaintiff's later filed Affidavit of Prejudice.
Exhibit Affidavit attached.
Respondent Murphy never requested a memorandum of
points and authorities regarding per se recusal in any other
of the six (6) pertinent cases as to plaintiff's Affidavits
of Prejudice filed therein.

Exhibit Affidavit attached.

Respondent Murphy never informed plaintiff that Judge
Murphy was refusing or declining to rule upon any of the
seven (7) Affidavits of Prejudice pertinent to this
proceeding because plaintiff herein declined or failed to
6

file a memorandum of points and authorities as to per se
recusal in the Blood case or in any other case.

Exhibit

Affidavit attached.
Plaintiff's response to Murphy's recent suggestion that
this Court was wrong when it ruled that Murphy requested the
filing of a memorandum regarding per se recusal is simple.
Judge Murphy never requested such a memorandum as to any of
the plaintiff's Affidavits of Prejudice1

In addition, this

Court ruled correctly that it is inappropriate for the
challenged judge to request such a memorandum of law (the
certified judge may do so).

The words "shall proceed no

further" simply and clearly prohibit the challenged judge
from asking for a memorandum of law or proceeding any
further in the case!
Judge Murphy's request for a memorandum of law creates
other potential major problems.

The request for a memo in

support of the motion for recusal was made in the Blood case
by Judge Murphy in an order dated May 27, 1992. Thereafter,
plaintiff filed an affidavit of Prejudice on December 7,
1992.

Without even so informing the plaintiff herein, Judge

Murphy contends that he declined to act on the December,
1992 Affidavit because of Barnard's failure to file a
memorandum six (6) months earlier.
7

Judge Murphy thus

created a secret condition precedent in Blood and, but for
the intervention of this Court apparently would never4 have
certified the Affidavit of Prejudice to another judge for
review.

LIVE CASES
Respondent Murphy contends in his Petition for Rehearing that the Shelley case and the Morris cases are now not
active and thus, Judge Murphy need not deal with the
Affidavits of Prejudice filed therein.
Rehearing, pp. 3-4.

Petition for

As discussed above, the viability of a

case when a Rule 63(b) affidavit is filed should be
determined by the certified judge and not the challenged
judge.
Both Shelley and Morris are divorce cases involving
children.

The trial court retains jurisdiction over the

4

One would have to question how long Judge Murphy was
going to wait for the memorandum allegedly requested in the
seven (7) cases. Common sense would dictate that if after
more than six (6) months (as in Blood) the memorandum was
not filed, that such a memorandum was not going to be filed.
After a reasonable time, it would be incumbent upon
Judge Murphy to deal with the Affidavit of Prejudice even
without the requested memorandum of law. The person filing
the Affidavit of Prejudice would have to bear the consequences, if any, of the failure to file a requested memorandum (if there was such a request); but that should not be
an excuse for the judge to never deal with the Affidavit of
Prejudice.
8

parties and their children at least until there is no longer
a child support obligation and the order of custody and
visitation has dissolved.

As noted in the Second Affidavit

of Plaintiff attached hereto, plaintiff is still counsel of
record for parties in both Shelley and Morris.

Just because

at a given time a divorce action may be dormant, that does
not mean the action is not alive and subject to further
proceedings before the trial court.

Besides, when plaintiff

filed the Affidavits of Prejudice in Shelley and in Morris,
the cases were clearly alive and there were matters pending
(only Judge Murphy's delay has created a basis for a claim
of mootness).

Exhibit Affidavit attached.

Finally, as set out in Plaintiff's Second Affidavit
attached, both Shelley and Morris are now unquestionably
active again.

If there is a need for plaintiff herein to

file additional Affidavits of Prejudice now in those two (2)
cases, plaintiff will do so.

However, plaintiff would

suggest that additional and duplicate affidavits are
unnecessary and inappropriate, since only Judge Murphy's
unjustifiable refusal to act when the first affidavits were
filed in January, 1993 caused the need for this proceeding.
Judge Murphy's mis-conduct should not be countenanced by
this Court.
9

The original Affidavits of Prejudice in Shelley and
Morris have never been ruled upon pursuant to Rule 63(b)•
Those cases were never completely disposed of and are still
pending before the trial court.
Not only are Judge Murphy's rulings (Exhibits "A" and
"B" to Plaintiff's Second Affidavit attached) as to mootness
of the affidavits in Shelley and Morris contrary to Rule
63(b) —

those rulings are wrong on the facts that existed

when the Affidavits were filed as well as under the current
facts of those cases.

CONCLUSION
The respondent's Petition for Rehearing is without
merit and should be denied.

The ruling of this Court of

April 29, 1993 is appropriate under the law and the facts of
this case.

DATED this 9th day of JUNE, 1993.

- BRIAN M. BARNARD
Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that (after lodging a copy with the
clerk of this court) I caused to be hand delivered a copy of
the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING to:
COLIN WINCHESTER
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS
230 South Fifth East
#300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
on the 9th day of JUNE, 1993.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING to:
COLIN WINCHESTER
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS
230 South Fifth East

#300

Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

on the 11th day of JUNE, 1993.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AFFIDAVIT

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB #0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIAN M. BARNARD,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

SECOND
AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER
Case No. 93-0136

THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY,
Judge, Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County,
Defendant/Respondent.

STATE OF UTAH
SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
THE PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER, BRIAN M. BARNARD, having been
duly sworn upon oath, based upon personal knowledge, deposes
and states as follows:

Shelley v. Shelley.
Case No. 90-490-1380, Third District Court
1.

On January 5, 1993, I filed an Affidavit of Pre-

judice against Judge Murphy in the Shelley case, a divorce
action.

2.

As of January 5, 1993 in the Shelley case, (1) a

petition for modification regarding child support was still
pending as well as (2) a motion to enforce visitation and,
(3) a motion to set aside the decree.
3.

On January 12, 1993 I submitted a request for trial

setting in the Shelley case, at that time the case appeared
to be contested and would require a trial before the assigned judge, Judge Murphy, respondent herein.
4.

There was a Pre-Trial Settlement Hearing before

Commissioner Arnett on February 10, 1993 at which the issues
were resolved.

The last order entered regarding those

matter was signed on February 22, 1993.
5.

The Shelley case is now active again; the plaintiff

has recently refused to allow the plaintiff visitation and
has disappeared.

A motion for an Order to Show Cause was

filed on May 26, 1993 seeking enforcement of the decree
regarding visitation and seeking an ex-parte order to
suspend child support.

I continue to be counsel for the

defendant Tim Shelley in that action.
6.

A true and correct copy of the recent Minute Entry

by Judge Murphy in Shelley is attached hereto as Exhibit
"A".

That Minute Entry of May 5, 1993 was made after the

decision by this Court in this case on April 29, 1993.
2

Morris v. Morris,
Case No. 89-490-3019, Third District Court
7.

The divorce case of Morris v. Morris is still

pending and although a stipulation for settlement has been
signed, the defendant has refused to provide supporting
income and financial information in order substantiate the
child support award.
8. A proceeding against the defendant Troy Douglas
Morris was required in order to force him to disclose his
income in order to substantiate the support calculations and
to finalize the settlement. The motion to compel disclosure
(dated June 8, 1993) was necessitated by the failure or
refusal of the defendant to supply such information since
December, 1992 and in spite of various phone calls and
letters requesting the information made to defendants
counsel.
9.

Although a stipulation has been filed settling the

issues in the Morris case, that stipulation and the final
order as matters in equity are subject to review and approval by the assigned judge. The assigned judge sitting in
equity has the discretion to approve or to not approve a
stipulation regarding child support, etc. Ut. Code Ann. §
3 0-3-5 (1953 as amended). To date the final order (and
3

supporting income information) has not been submitted to the
Court in Morris.
10.

The Morris case was pending when the Affidavit of

Prejudice was filed on January 5, 1993 because the stipulation and final settlement had to be submitted to and
approved by the Court and appropriate income verification
must still be submitted.
11.

Exhibit "B" attached.

A true and correct copy of the Minute Entry by

Judge Murphy in Morris is attached hereto as Exhibit flB".
That Minute Entry of May 5, 1993 was made after the decision
by this Court in this case on April 29, 1993.
12.

As per Exhibit "B" attached, Judge Murphy

acknowledges that Morris is still pending before him
("Counsel should submit [to the court] an order consistent
with the stipulation and all necessary child support
papers."

Id.)

Five (5) Other Cases
13.

In the other five (5) cases referred to in the

decision of this Court in this matter, Judge Murphy has
acted in compliance with the April 29, 1993 decision of this
Court and has referred those five (5) cases and plaintiff's
affidavits of prejudice (two in each case) to another judge
4

for review.

The affidavits filed in all of those cases were

referred to the same judge, Third District Court Judge Timothy Hanson for review.
14.

True and correct copies of the Minute Entries of

May 5, 1993 by Judge Murphy in each of those other five (5)
cases are attached hereto as Exhibits "C" - "G".
15.

Those five (5) Minute Entries (May 5, 1993) were

made after the April 29, 1993 decision by this Court in this
case.

Purpose of Delay
16.

Respondent Murphy requested a memorandum of points

and authorities regarding per se recusal only in one case,
Blood.

That was requested only with regard to plaintiff's

motion for recusal in Blood.

Plaintiff never filed such a

memorandum and has, for all intents and purposes, abandoned
that motion for recusal.
17.

Respondent Murphy never requested a memorandum of

points and authorities regarding per se recusal in Blood as
to plaintiff's later filed Affidavit of Prejudice.
18.

Respondent Murphy never requested a memorandum of

points and authorities regarding per se recusal in any other

5

of the six (6) pertinent cases as to plaintiff's Affidavits
of Prejudice filed therein.
19.

Respondent Murphy never informed plaintiff that

Judge Murphy was refusing or declining to rule upon any of
the seven (7) Affidavits of Prejudice pertinent to this
proceeding because plaintiff herein declined or failed to
file a memorandum of points and authorities as to per se
recusal in the Blood case or in any other case.

DATED this 9th day of JUNE, 1993.

>r/Affiant
VERIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF UTAH
SS,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
THE ABOVE NAMED PARTY, BRIAN M. BARNARD, personally

appeared before me, a notary public, on the date above
written, and having been duly sworn upon oath acknowledged
to me that he was the person that had executed that above
and foregoing document, having rkad and understood it, and
knowing the contents thereof, swearing that the contents are
true, and having voluntarily subscribed his name thereto
intending to be bound thereby.

d i U S BENSON I
210 Ecst 500 South
I
Salt L d c City. U t * 84111 J
My CgmmSwfon Expires •

~

ofbtah

jl

NOTARY PUBLIC
FUgklC
STATE OF UTAH
6

ANGELAS BENSON

I

% £ W * ? « * \ W £ 84111'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a
true and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
PETITIONER with attachments to:
COLIN WINCHESTER
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS
230 South Fifth East
#300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
on the 9th day of JUNE, 1993.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff

c:\regcue\bmbmuip3 ,iff\bmb
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Third Judicial District

MAY

5 1933

„ ~w

SALT LAKjE COUNTY
Deputy Clfere

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

GLORIA JANE SHELLEY (BRAND),

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 904901380

Plaintiff,
vis.
TIMOTHY GEORGE SHELLEY,
Defendant.

There does not appear to be any pending matter to be heard or
tried.

The Rule 63(b) affidavit is, therefore, moot.

Dated this

_day of May, 1993.

MICHABL'R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
•»»

2

«

SHELLEY V. SHELLEY

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE TWO

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this
1993:

Gloria Shelley (Brand)
Plaintiff
1128 East 6600 South #3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120
Brian M. Barnard
John Pace
Attorneys for Defendant
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204

^5

dav of May,

Third Judicial District

MAY

5 1993

». 77

COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IK AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TAWNA LIN MORRIS,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 894903019

Plaintiff,
vs.
TROY DOUGLAS MORRIS,
Defendant.

The parties on December 31, 1992 filed a stipulation resolving
all pending issues. There is, therefore, no pending matter to be
heard or tried.

As a consequence, the Rule 63(b) affidavit is

moot.

should

Counsel

submit an order

consistent with the

stipulation and all necessary child support papers.
Dated this v 1

day of May, 1993.

MICHAEL R. MUPRHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
•i

B

..

MORRIS V. MORRIS

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILIKG CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this.
1993:

Brian M. Barnard
John Pace
Attorneys for Plaintiff
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
John K. Morrison
Attorney for Defendant
48 W. Market Street, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

_day of May,

Third Judicial District

MAY

5 1993

SALT LAKE COUHTY
De*juiy Ci*SK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND POR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

LYNN R. MONTGOMERY,

ORDER
CASE NO. 904903394

Plaintiff,
vs.
JUDY IRENE MONTGOMERY,
Defendant.

The February 9, 1993 order is withdrawn.
The assigned judge questions the sufficiency of the Rule 63 (b)
affidavit. The matter is certified to Judge Hanson to pass on the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit.
Dated this ~S

day of May, 1993.

MICHAEL /R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

f

PLAINTIFF
EXHIBIT

MONTGOMERY V. MONTGOMERY

PAGE TWO

ORDER

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order, to the following, this

Brian M. Barnard
Attorney for Plaintiff
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Randall Gaither
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

f^

dav of May, 1993:

^k£:W Lruik. S b % . < * B

«k » •* - « •

Third Judicial District

MAY

5 1993
£COUNTY

By-

/

(

Deputy ClOrK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KARL JENSEN,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
CASE NO. 914903233

vs.
SUSAN JENSEN,
Defendant.

The assigned judge questions the sufficiency of the Rule 63 (b)
affidavit. The matter is certified to Judge Hanson to pass on the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit.
Dated this_^

_day of May, 1993.

MICHAEL^R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

JENSEN V. JENSEN

ORDER

PAGE TWO

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order

day of May, 1993:

Judith Romney Wolbach
Attorney for Plaintiff
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1123
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Brian M. Barnard
Attorney for Defendant
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204

^n« Jfear

FttEP DETECT CTCET
Third Judicial District

MAY

»,tfr

5 1933
COUNTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Hatter of the
Adoption of:

ORDER
CASE NO. 932900103

JARON JOSEPH RAMSEY,
A minor.

The assigned judge questions the sufficiency of the Rule 63 (b)
affidavit. The matter is certified to Judge Hanson to pass on the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit.
Dated this ^_T day of May, 1993.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
,,

" E «, ,, ,

ADOPTION OF JARON JOSEPH RAMSEY

PAGE TWO

PAGE TWO

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order, to the following, this ~~^

day of May, 1993:

Brian M. Barnard
John Pace
Attorneys f o r P e t i t i o n e r
214 East 500 South
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84111-3204

~mS>M&

RLEGCETESTCem
Third Judicial District

MAY

5 1993

, rzxr

COUNTY

Deputy Gitr*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
In the Hatter of the
Name Change of:

ORDER
CASE NO. 933900296

RICHARD ANTHONY CARROLL.

The assigned judge questions the sufficiency of the Rule 63(b)
affidavit. The matter is certified to Judge Hanson to pass on the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit.
Dated this

*~) day of May, 1993.

M_

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

IN THE MATTER OF
RICHARD ANTHONY CARROLL

PAGE TWO

ORDER

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order, to the following, this f)

Brian M. Barnard
John Pace
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

day of May, 1993:

o

rttED DISTRICT CC3RT
Third Judicial District

MAY

5 1993

SALVLAKE COUNTY

—^Z

Deputy CJerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OP UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, Department
of Human Services,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
CASE NO. 92090 397

vs.
DEREK J. BLOOD and
LEAH M. PHILLIPS,
Defendants.
The assigned judge questions the sufficiency of the Rule 63 (b)
affidavit•

The matter is certified to Judge Hanson to pass on the

legal sufficiency of the affidavit.
Dated this . ~f

dav of May, 1993.

M

MICHAEL M7 MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

STATE V. BLOOD

ORDER
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order, to the fc»,l 1 o wi i lg, tihis fT

Jean P. Hendrickson
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980
Brian M. Barnard
Attorney for Defendant Blood
214 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Ut^h
84111-3204
Leah M. Phillips
Pro se
4253 South 2735 West:
Salt Lake City, Utah
>
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